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I found many of the assertions and conclusions contained in
William B. Burnett and William E. Kovacic's article, The Reform
of United States Weapons Acquisition Policy: Competition, Teaming
Agreements, and Dual-Sourcing' to be valid, despite the fact that
much of the authors' commentary expresses concern about the
Navy's use of competition and dual-sourcing. Although recent
scrutiny of the defense acquisition process has created a furor
among those unfamiliar with the process,' Burnett and Kovacic
chave presented a generally accurate picture of the acquisition
process and the recent changes that it has undergone.
This Comment analyzes several specific areas discussed by
Burnett and Kovacic. Part I explains why Congress should resist
implementing new laws and regulations. Part II reviews the role
of competition and how it has improved defense procurement by
lowering costs and improving quality through dual-sourcing. It
then responds to some criticisms of dual-sourcing that Burnett
and Kovacic advance. Part III discusses the professionalism of the
aquisition workforce. This Comment concludes with an examina-
tion of the alternative strategies discussed by Burnett and Kovacic.
I. Resisting New Laws and Regulations
As Burnett and Kovacic assert, Congress and the Department
of Defense (DOD) should resist the impulse to add new laws and
regulations.' There are already over four thousand individual
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new procurement approaches discussed in this and the accompanying artide and comments.
Much of the information presented is derived from first-hand experience. The following
members of the United States Navy Supply Corps made significant contributions to this
Comment: Rear Admiral William H. Hauenstein, Captain Phillip H. Harrington, Captain
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1. Burnett & Kovacic, Reform of United States Weapons Aquisition Policy: Competition,
Teaming Agreements, and Dual-Sourcing, 6 YA.E J. ow REG. 249 (1989).
2. See id. at 249-51.
3. Id. at 313.
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statutory provisions that affect the procurement process.' For
fiscal year 1989 alone, the National Defense Authorization Act,5
the DOD Appropriations Act,6 and the Office of Federal Procure-
ment Policy (OFPP) Act Amendments' contained forty-three new
procurement policy and reform provisions.8 Implementation of
new laws is widely believed to have caused an increase in the
number of protests filed with the General Accounting Office
during the past several years.
Notwithstanding the Navy's most stringent efforts, procurement
administrative lead time9 has grown during this period from 84
to 132 days.' 0 This increased lead time unnecessarily delays the
delivery of urgently needed systems and their associated logistic
support to the fleet. Current regulations necessitated by the new
laws are responsible for most of the delay," and new legislation
would be only counterproductive. Although there is no question
that the acquisition system can be, and is being, improved, the
answer to each new procurement horror story is not additional
legislation. Those involved in the procurement process need time
to absorb and to evaluate recent legislation before embarking on
new initiatives. 2
II. Competition
The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) of 1984"s is uni-
que among Congress's recent laws concerning the procurement
4. U.S. OfficE OF MANAGEME'r & BUDGEr, MANAGEMENTr OF T11E UNITED STATES GOvERNMENr
88 (1989).
5. Pub. L. No. 100-456, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & AoMIN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 2007.
6. Pub. L. No. 100-463, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEWS (102 Stat.) 2270.
7. Pub. L. No. 100-679, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIN. NEws (102 Stat.) 4055.
8. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Production & Logistics, Selected
Procurement Policy Reform Provisions (1989) (on file with author).
9. Procurement administrative lead time is the time from when a procurement request
is received to when a contract is awarded.
10. Office of the Naval Supply Systems Command, Data on Administrative Lead Time
(1989) (on file with author).
11. Originally, two statutes governed most of the procurement system: the Armed
Services Procurement Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-413, 62 Stat. 21 (1948) (codified as
amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2301 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)), and the Federal Property and
Administrative Services Act of 1949, Pub. L No. 81-152, 63 Stat. 377 (codified as amended
at 41 U.S.C. §§ 251-260 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
12. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON SIMPu.fiCATION AND
SrirAMIJNING Or AcQuisrnON PRocEDuiEs 7-8 (1988).
13. Pub. L. No. 98-369, 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (98 Stat.) 1175 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 10, 31 & 41 U.S.C.).
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process. It has simplified the procurement process by strengthen-
ing the statutory basis for competition. Burnett and Kovacic wisely
recommend that the government should now "should attempt to
refine rivalry-based techniques for purchasing weapon systems
and should reduce existing regulatory requirements."'4 The Navy
has taken the lead in reducing these regulatory requirements.
For example, the Navy recently stopped requiring cost and
pricing data in dual-sourced programs when adequate price
competition exists. 5 The benefits of this policy change have been
demonstrated through both reduced lead times and lower costs
of weapon systems. In 1987, the production contract for the
Trident submarine was open to competitive bidding for the first
time. Spared the need for costly and time-consuming audits, the
Navy completed evaluation and award of the contract in only one
month after receiving the proposals. In addition to these
significant time and labor savings, the government achieved a cost
savings of over $74 million on three vessels. 16
In a competitive acquisition, data submissions and audits sim-
ply add to the overall cost and lead time of the acquisition
without providing a corresponding benefit. 7 Competition, not
administrative paperwork or more audits, has provided the most
effective discipline.
A. Cutting Costs Through Competition
Regulatory measures do little to increase corporate motivation
to control costs.18 In fact, because negotiated profits under a regu-
latory framework are based on costs, management has little incen-
14. Burnett & Kovacic, supra note 1, at 256.
15. 48 C.F.R. §§ 5215.804-3 (b)(3)(iii), 5252.215-9000(a) (1988) (concerning use of cost
or pricing data and cost evaluation when adequate price competition exists).
16. FiscAl YEA.x 1988 Off. OF TlE CoMPiTrioN ADVOCATE GEN. OF THE NAVY, REPORT To
CONGRESS 11-2 (Dec. 1988) [hereinafter NAVY Rr.ORT TO CONGRtES].
17. The government pays a high price for the contractor to prepare data to support
its price, especially if the data must be certified. The government must also pay for an
audit. Both of these reviews require expenditures of time as well as money. These can be
reduced if the contracting officer is able to use competition to help contain the contractor's
price.
18. For example, 10 U.S.C. § 2304 (1982) requires a prime contractor, or any
subcontractor, to submit cost or pricing data under certain circumstances, and to certify
that, to the best of its knowledge and belief, the cost or pricing data submitted is accurate,
current, and complete. We have found these requirements to be burdensome and onerous,
and they should be employed only when necessary.
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tive to control costs. Moreover, rework of rejected material 9
under a regulatory system has been of little concern because it
tends to increase costs and thus increases the baseline from which
profits are calculated."°
Competition-based contracts have dramatically changed this
environment."' Instead of looking for ways to maintain prices,
contractors now must focus their attention on reducing prices,
improving quality, and producing efficiently to maximize profit.22
Figure 1" relates the reduction of prices for the Tomahawk cruise
missile program to the introduction of competition for producing
it. It shows that competition not only has increased the slope of
the manufacturers' cost improvement curve, but also has displaced
the curve. Prior to the introduction of competition, a ninety
percent cost improvement curve was expected. After competition
between General Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas, the first and
second competitive awards continued to follow a ninety percent
curve even though fixed costs at the two facilities were being
absorbed by the manufacturers. The third competitive award
showed more than a twenty percent displacement from historical
experience. In addition, awards over the following two years
showed an increase in the slope of the cost improvement curve.
19. Rework costs are those costs incurred and absorbed by the contractor due to
faulty work that has been inspected and rejected by the government. Quality control experts
have shown how rework and scrap losses due to process problems actually drive up the cost
of poor quality products. See, e.g., W. DyING, Our Ov Tgui Clusts (1986).
20. Recent changes in the profit policy that were sponsored by the Navy have
changed this incentive by rewarding capital investment rather than cost increases. See U.S.
D r'T" or DEwmsF., DEvEwNsE AcQuISIION CIRCUIAlt 15.902 (1987).
21. The requirement to provide extensive cost or pricing data is waived when the
negotiated contract price is based on adequate price competition, established catalog or
market prices of commercial items sold in substantial quantities to the general public, prices
set by law or regulation, or, in exceptional cases, when the head of the agency determines
that the requirements may be waived and states in writing the reasons for such determina-
tion. See 10 U.S.C. § 2306(0(2) (1982). One of the advantages of using competition to deter-
mine prices is that it allows the market to set prices rather than resorting to the collection
and detailed analysis of contractor-generated cost data.
22. In addition to private-private competitive benefits, the Navy has experienced
similar benefits from competition between private and public sector facilities as well.
23. Naval Center for Cost Analysis, Analysis of Competitive Procurement of Selected
Navy Weapon Systems, Tab 4 (Jan. 3, 1988) (unpublished government study) (on file with
author) [hereinafter Analysis of Procurement].
24. A cost improvement curve is obtained by plotting all costs associated with
production against the units produced. Slope is determined by taking the dollar amount
of savings obtained each time the quantity produced doubles, and subtracting this amount
from the previous cost. For example, an 80% cost improvement curve results when the
savings between the 20th and the 40th item are 20%. The term "displacement" means a
drop in the curve completely independent from expected cost improvemenL
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As a result of these changes, the Navy expects a cumulative




General Dynamics/Convair (GD/C) vs McDonnell Douglas
Astronautics Corporation (MDAC)
80 82 84 86 88 90
Fiscal Year
25. See Analysis of Procurement, supra note 23. at Tab 4.
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Burnett and Kovacic express concern that contractors may opt
to bid a losing strategy. 6 This fear has proven unfounded in
practice. It appears that contractors' desire to win a substantial
portion of a weapons production award is greater than any
tendency to exploit the competitive structure with a bid-to-lose
approach. While the potential for gaming can never be elimi-
nated, the procurement structure should be designed to avoid it
whenever possible. The possibility of an all-or-nothing split in the
award of dual-sourced contracts can discourage any losing
strategy. Furthermore, if the Navy suspects that one offeror is
using a loser strategy, it can refuse to award that portion of the
contract to the offeror unless the price is determined to be fair
and reasonable. This may require negotiating with the loser as if
on a sole-source basis (with all its pitfalls) to bring the price into
line. However, the existence of another source strengthens the
government's hand in comparison to that which it holds in a true
sole-source negotiation.
Cost reductions similar to those experienced in the Tomahawk
program have occurred in every other program that the Navy has
dual-sourced, whether those programs involve high rates of
production, as with missiles, or low rates of production, as with
the cruiser program." Head-to-head competitions were conducted
for the purchases of the AEGIS Cruiser during the period from
1984 to 1988. We estimate that gross savings from competition
will exceed $1.8 billion-more than enough to cover the cost of
establishing the second source and any additional administrative
costs. Even in a low-quantity program such as shipbuilding, dual-
sourcing provides cost reductions that are not available under
sole-sourcing. Contrary to the authors' assertions, 8 there is no
reason to believe that similar savings will not result from the
competition for the Advanced Tactical Aircraft (ATA) or the V-
22 Tilt-rotor (Osprey) aircraft. Competition causes contractors to
cut costs through more efficient production methods to improve
26. See Burnett & Kovacic, supra note 1, at 287-89. A losing strategy is one where a
contractor is willing to lose in a dual-source competition when guaranteed the loser's
percentage of the production total. For example, the contractor might decide that it is
better to bid a higher price, and thereby receive a "loser's" 30% share of the production
total, rather than bid a lower price for the 70% share of production.
27. See, e.g., Analysis of Procurement, supra note 23 (providing examples of cost sav-
ings achieved through dual-sourcing). Cf. NAvy RF.PORT T"O CONGRESS, supra note 16, at 11-3,
IH-7 (providing examples of savings achieved through more widely used "full and open"
competitive procedures).
28. Burnett & Kovacic, supra note 1, at 292-93.
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quality. This results in savings regardless of the weapon system's
complexity or production quantities. Table 1" shows the savings
achieved through competitive production of various military
hardware.
Table 1
















































0 Start-up costs not separately identified
B. Improving Quality Through Competition
Competition has also improved product quality. For example,
rejection rates for "all-up-round"0 production of the Tomahawk
29. See generaUy Analysis of Procurement, supra note 23.
30. "All-up-round" missiles are purchased by the Navy from an integrator who takes
responsibility for the components as well as final assembly of the missile.
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cruise missile have declined steadily since the introduction of a
second source. Another indication of improved quality is the de-
crease in rework costs in ship repair. These two examples, which
are typical of the Navy's experience with competition, show that
competition forces contractors to improve their quality and to
reduce rework costs by doing the job correctly the first time.S
An additional benefit of competition has been to avoid the
contraction of our national production base that would have oc-
curred without dual-sourcing. Spreading production among several
companies helps to ensure a solid industrial base for future
peacetime development, as well as a production base for weapons
should a mobilization effort become necessary. Although this
contribution to the national defense posture cannot be quantified,
it is obviously significant.
C. Response to Criticism of Dual-Sourcing
Burnett and Kovacic discuss what are perceived to be short-
comings of dual-sourcing. They claim that dual-sourcing requires
increased capital expenditures that exceed the benefits of compe-
tition. 2 Costs of technology transfer, tooling, and administrative
support, however, are usually small compared to total program
life cycle costs, even for programs of short duration. These costs
represent approximately three percent of the total funds in any
program." Tooling is the largest portion of this cost, but my
experience has been that tooling of a second source is usually
only half as expensive as tooling of the original source.
Burnett and Kovacic contend that overall costs of contract ad-
ministration increase with the addition of another contractor.4
This is not true. Savings attributable to reduced sole-source
haggling are almost equal to increases required by the coordina-
tion of two sources.
The authors' concern that companies will cut research and
development efforts to avoid transferring technical expertise to
31. Vice Admiral G. Davis, Jr., Remarks at the Third Annual Navy Competition
Advocate Symposium 11 (Nov. 4. 1987) (on file with author).
32. Burnett & Kovacic, supra note 1, at 287.
33. This 3% is an average of eight dual-source programs with various years of
production remaining. It is derived by dividing the cost for starting a second source by
the value of the program remaining under a sole-source procurement. Annual production
rate is the number of units of a weapon system produced per year.
34. Burnett & Kovacic, supra note 1, at 287.
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their competitors35 is also unfounded. Because technological ad-
vances can result in savings, companies have not shown a willing-
ness to give up their technological capabilities. Moreover, compe-
tition in the early phases of a program is focused more on
technical issues than on price. Failure to maintain a technical
edge could cause a supplier to lose the ability to participate in
the program. I have not seen any evidence to support the
concern raised by the authors.
I do not agree with Burnett and Kovacic's conclusion that
teaming should be discouraged in future dual-source programs . 6
Teaming to improve the ability of an offeror to participate in a
major acquisition is not a new concept. Although it has not been
tested as much as other forms of dual-sourcing, it can bring true
competition into a program at its inception and maintain it
throughout production.
Burnett and Kovacic decry the teaming experience of Northrop
and McDonnell Douglas on the F/A-18." The basic issue in that
dispute concerned the companies' respective market shares of
non-Navy sales; it did not concern a relationship with the Navy.
Although this was a very real problem for these companies, it is
always dangerous to generalize from a specific instance as the
authors have done. Presumably, the lessons learned will not be
lost on these companies or the rest of the defense industry. Until
we have more experience with teaming and the defense industry's
adjustment to it, it is premature to seek advice from the Federal
Trade Commission or the Department of Justice, as suggested by
the authors. 8
Burnett and Kovacic correctly point out that fewer new weap-
ons programs are likely to be started in the future. 9 This is due
to the need to meet the defense objectives of the country in the
most cost-effective manner. We can no longer afford the luxury
of developing weapon systems to meet a narrow range of threats.
Instead, we must develop the capability for a flexible response
through a single system. The delivery platform, whether it is a
DDG-51 class destroyer, ATA, ATF, B-2, or LHX must be
designed within these parameters. It is only through teaming that
35. Id. at 286-87.
36. Id. at 279-81.
37. Id. at 276-78.
38. Id. at 307-10.
39. Id. at 273.
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the defense industry realistically can develop the increasingly
flexible weapon systems that the armed forces require.
III. The Professionalism of the Weapons Aquisition Workforce
Burnett and Kovacic correctly identify the training and compe-
tency of the workforce as keys to the successful implementation
of competition. However, their blanket assertion that contractor
employees are "better trained, better paid, more experienced and
more highly motivated than their government counterparts,"40
grossly oversimplifies the different roles that government and
contractor employees play in military procurement. The armed
forces are hampered in ways that private industry is not bur-
dened. First, labyrinthine laws and regulations govern DOD
acquisitions. Second, full and open competition is the law. Third,
minority business goals and small business set-asides are routine
in many areas. Fourth, preference for products made in the
United States and concerns over the balance of payments
influence source selection. Finally, annual appropriations prevent
long-term commitments. Although these requirements serve valu-
able purposes, they create an environment for the public sector
buyer that is markedly different from that of the private employ-
ee.
Because well-trained professionals add tremendously to the
chances for conducting successful acquisition, DOD has long
required a wide array of training to maintain its standards."1 Re-
cently, DOD raised the standards for its entry level acquisition
personnel by requiring a minimum standard of business-related,
college-level courses for those interested in a career in military
contracting. 2 In addition, the Navy has experimented with special
programs to improve the contracting specialists' professional sta-
tus.'3 Developing these and additional programs should ensure
that the government has the best trained, most experienced, and
most professional career contracting work force possible.
40. Id. at 306.
41. U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, DOD CrvUnA CARF.R PROGRAM FOR CoNrRAcrING AND
AcQUISrnON PERSONNEL (Dec. 1982) (DOD 1430.10-M-1) (on file with author).
42. U.S. OffiCE or PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECFRoS OF PERSONNEL,
QUALIfICATION STANDARD FOR Two-GRADE IJN-ERVAL ADMINISTRATIVE, MANAGEMENT, AND SPECIALIST
POSITIONS (Aug. 10, 1988) (on file with author).
43. See, e.g., PRasiDENT's BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON DEFENSE MANAGEMENT, A QUEST FOR
EXC.LLENCE-FINA. REPORT TO THE PRFsIDEtr, Appendix J (1986) (describing alternative
personnel program at China Lake, Cal.).
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Notwithstanding higher salaries within the private sector, the
Navy's acquisition team is composed of extremely dedicated, moti-
vated, and capable personnel. Many of our employees turn to
government service out of a desire to serve their country. Private
industry's interest in hiring the Navy's acquisition personnel is
itself evidence of the Navy's success in recruiting and training
qualified employees. Although some valued employees are eventu-
ally lost to industry, employee turnover is expected in every busi-
ness. It would cause far greater concern if none of the Navy's
contracting personnel ever received an offer from the private sec-
tor. It is simply wrong to assume that the public sector loses its
best and brightest to industry; we retain our appropriate share.
IV. Recommendations
Although Burnett and Kovacic support dual-sourcing and agree
that the regulatory process has failed to produce adequate results,
the authors recommend several alternatives to dual-sourced
production. Some are valuable and could make significant
contributions to the Navy's goals of low-cost, high-quality military
hardware, but some are not as useful as the authors suggest.
First, funding research and development capability directly"
does little, if anything, to provide a competitive production base.
The current system of setting ceilings on independent research
and development is not perfect, but it does attempt to match
research with need, something that the authors' suggested
improvement does not do. Therefore, the current system of
monitoring independent research and development should be
retained.
Second, upgrading existing systems45 is a sound concept that
the Navy actively pursues. For example, the USS Coral Sea and
USS Midway are World War II vintage aircraft carriers that con-
tinue to serve as deploying carriers. Through prudent upgrades
of their entire range of capabilities, these carriers continue to be
effective platforms from which the Navy can launch its most mod-
ern aircraft. Likewise, the Sidewinder missile, which was devel-
oped in the 1950s, continues to be an effective weapon due to a
continuing series of improvements. The A-6 and F-14 also have
been upgraded to extend their useful lives and give them the
44. Burnett & Kovadc, supra note 1, at 299-300.
45. Id. at 297.
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capability to meet current threats. However, as is true with most
weapon systems regardless of how they were developed, there
will come a time when the threat will outpace the upgrade and
demand an ATA, B-2, or SSN-21.
Third, employing close substitutes"' can sometimes enhance
competition, but such instances are rare. This is especially true
for major weapon systems. The case of the F/A-18 and F-14/A-6
tradeoff cited by the authors is unique. 7 Normally, weapon sys-
tems do not have sufficient overlap in mission capability to allow
one to be substituted for another. The Navy continues to look for
opportunities to substitute, but can rarely find them, even across
service lines. An F-16 cannot land on an aircraft carrier and still
be an F-16.
The Navy has had considerable success, however, in using near
substitutes outside the major weapon systems arena. By specifying
minimum salient characteristics, the Navy has found new vendors
using brand name or equal solicitations. The increased emphasis
on nondevelopmental items allows movement away from milita-
rized specification to commercial equivalents. In this area of
acquisition, Burnett-and Kovacic's advocacy of substitutes meshes
with Navy practice being used on a daily basis throughout the
procurement system.
Fourth, increased recourse to foreign suppliers48 is an option
when foreign suppliers can meet the Navy's needs. One example
is the MHC-51 Coastal Minehunter. This acquisition represents a
leap in technology from a wooden hull to a fiberglass hull that
had its origin in the Italian Lerici design. Another foreign item
is the Penguin missile from Norway, which eliminated the need
to develop a U.S. look-alike missile. Similarly, the Kfir aircraft
from Israel fulfills a particular need in the Navy's pilot training
program. These three examples are typical of the Navy's efforts
to look worldwide to satisfy its military needs.
Finally, greater use of government research and development"
seems inappropriate in a discussion of production competition.
There is no need to increase government research and develop-
ent beyond current levels of funding. The private sector has the
brainpower, resources, and incentives to accomplish most research
46. Id. at 297-98.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 298-99.
49. Id. at 299-300.
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and development needs. The Navy already pays for a significant
share of military related research through Independent Research
& Development 0  agreements with defense contractors and
contracts with various universities such as the Applied Physics
Lab at Johns Hopkins University. These university contracts
ensure that developments in academia are brought to our
attention for further exploration.
Conclusion
The Navy's experience shows that efficiency is promoted
through competition rather than through extensive regulations.
The current legal framework is more than sufficient to achieve
this competitive streamlining, and additional regulation may prove
more harmful than beneficial. Our experiences with dual-sourcing
show a tremendous return on investment; payback typically occurs
less than two years after the inception of head-to-head competi-
tion. No other process has as great a potential to control costs,
to improve product quality, and to assure a production base. All
the armed services must continue to consolidate the experiences
of competition, to refine the competitive procurement process,
and to continue to expand it to sectors beyond the major weapon
systems arena.
50. See, e.g.. 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-19 (1987).

